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Abstract
Why have some researchers found reports of flashbulb memories to be stable, while others have
observed inconsistencies? Paradoxically, it appears that relatively long delays between event and
initial documentation have produced greater consitency of participants’ reports. To investigate
this directly, we collected the initial documentation of hearing about O.J. Simpson’s acquittal
either 5 hours or one week after the acquittal was read. Observed consistency of memories varied
as a function of documentation time; following an 8-week retention, the delayed reports were
more consistent. The delayed group also reported fewer propositions in their initial
documentation. We proposed a consolidation model to explain these results: During the days
immediately following a newsworthy event, the narrative structure of these memories changes in
that some details are forgotten. After this consolidation period, the memories may solidify. Thus,
it may have been easier for the delayed group to provide consistent memories at the two
intervals.
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Flashbulb Memories?
The Effects of When the Initial Memory Report was Obtained
When asking people where they were when they heard that President Kennedy had been
shot, Brown and Kulik (1977) observed long-lasting, detailed memories. They proposed that
such “flashbulb memories” may be caused by a special memory mechanism that operates during
the encoding of surprising, important, and emotionally arousing events. This mechanism causes
people to store an exact record of the contents of the mind. The resulting memory is long-lasting,
and also accurate. Most research since Brown and Kulik’s initial report has centered around their
claim of extreme accuracy and resistance to forgetting (e.g. McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988;
Weaver, 1993). Thus the debate concerning a special mechanism for flashbulb memories is
partly dependent on the accuracy of flashbulb memories.
In order to ensure a precise measurement of memory accuracy, it is important that the
circumstances surrounding the reception of important news be documented or indexed shortly
after the event occurs (Neisser, 1982). The initial documentation of the circumstances
surrounding the reception event can then be compared to subsequent recalls resulting in a
measure of consistency. Since the Brown and Kulik (1977) study, several researchers have
compared initial documentations of an event with subsequent recalls. The level of consistency,
however, varies widely. Nonetheless a trend emerges: Researchers who documented the events
shortly after they occurred (Larsen, 1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Weaver, 1993) have
generally found less consistency than those who waited longer before documenting the event
(Christianson, 1989; Conway et al., 1994; Pillemer, 1984). See Table 1 for a summary of time
delays and consistency measures across various flashbulb studies.
For example, the morning after the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, Neisser
and Harsch (1992) questioned a group of participants as to how they heard the news. Over two
years later, the participants' memories were tested again. Neisser and Harsch reported a high
incidence of errors in the follow-up questioning. A large proportion of the participants in Neisser
and Harsch's study forgot "major details", such as the informant, location, or ongoing activity. In
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measuring consistency, participants were scored from 0, if no major details matched, to 7, if all
major details and other information matched. Only 7% of the participants received the maximum
score of 7, 9% received a score of 6, 25% were completely inconsistent, and 50% scored 2 or
less on the consistency scale. Furthermore, many participants stuck to their erroneous stories;
even showing them their initial reports did not aid recovery of their original memories. The
errors were firmly ensconced. Other researchers have documented the reception event
circumstances shortly afterwards and also found a high level of inconsistency (Larsen, 1992;
McCloskey, Wible, & Cohen, 1988; Weaver, 1993).
Not all researchers report finding inconsistencies in flashbulb memories. For example,
Conway et al. (1994) conducted a flashbulb memory study for hearing the news of Margaret
Thatcher’s resignation. The initial assessments, however, were made up to 14 days after the
resignation and compared to reports collected nearly one year later. Conway et al. reported very
high levels of consistency among UK participants: Approximately 59% reported the exact
information at Time 2 as they had at Time 1 and 86% of the participants received a consistency
score of at least 9 out of a possible 10 points (see Pillemer, 1984, for similar findings). They
concluded that a special mechanism is needed to explain flashbulb memories. However, Conway
et al. assumed that the initial descriptions were accurate, even though the event had occurred up
to 14 days prior to the documentation of the memories.
Neisser, Winograd, Bergman, Schreiber, Palmer, & Weldon (1996) data provides
a unique opportunity to examine the effect of different time delays between the event and
indexing of that event on the consistency of reports. They looked at individuals
recollections regarding the Loma Prieta earthquake. Data from participants in Santa Cruz
were collected 15 - 21 days after the earthquake. In contrast, data from Berkeley
participants were collected only 1 - 3 days after the earthquake. According to Neisser et
al., the difference in time delays may be related to the observation that the Santa Cruz
participants provided more consistent accounts of their experiences than did the Berkeley
students.
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We consider two possible explanations for why more errors are observed when events are
documented shortly after an event occurs. First, errors may be caused by the introduction of postevent information (Loftus, 1975, 1979; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974).
People continue to learn more about important public events even after they first learn of it:
People hear stories from other individuals about how they received the news, they receive
additional news about the event, and they may embellish their own accounts in subsequent
retellings (Winningham, Orebaugh, Steves, & Weaver, 1997). The eventual story an individual
settles on may be a reconstruction of information from all these sources. This reconstruction may
be relatively complete within a few days, unless an individual has a reason to continue
considering the event.
A second explanation is that the observed inconsistencies are an artifact of forgetting.
Most information is forgotten shortly after an event (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913). Thus the
immediate recollections will be most detailed and when these memories are compared to later,
more vague, recollections, many inconsistencies will be apparent. In contrast, when delayed
recollections are compared to later recollections, fewer inconsistencies will be observed because
both are at a similar level of vagueness.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to meaningfully compare results across studies. Researchers
have measured different aspects of different events, used different scoring methods, and varied
the time intervals both at the original documentation and the later recalls. Therefore, the present
study was designed to examine if the time delay between the event and initial documentation is
related to the consistency of reports. We examined this hypothesis by documenting participants’
recollection of hearing of O.J. Simpson’s acquittal either immediately (5 hours) or after a delay
(1 week). All individuals provided a second recollection eight weeks after the event. We
predicted that the immediate group would be less consistent between their Time 1 and Time 2
reports than the delayed group.
We decided to use O.J. Simpson’s acquittal as the event in this study. The reading of the
verdict was the end of a long drawn out trial, in which O.J. Simpson, an African American sports
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hero, was accussed of killing his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ron Goldman in
1994. This was a significant and newsworthy event. According to a 1995 CNN poll 88% of
Americans learned of the verdict within 30 minutes of its announcement. Moreover, we found
that over three years after the acquittal, 82% of college students surveyed would have been
classified as having a flashbulb memory for this event, according to Brown and Kulik’s criterion.
Method
Participants
Two groups of participants were used in this study. Each group of participants was
enrolled in an undergraduate psychology course and tested as a group during class time. The two
classes were both required courses for undergraduate psychology majors, therefore the classes
should have been very similar. The sample was relatively homogenous, 88% of the participants
were female and 97% were Caucasian. The immediate group (n=35) was tested five hours after
the O.J. Simpson verdict was read. The delayed group (n=30) was tested one week after the
acquittal.
Materials and Procedure
After the participants read and signed informed consent forms, the questionnaires were
distributed. The questionnaires were completed during the last half of 50-minute classes. The
participants were instructed to answer all questions as best as they could.
At Time 1, both groups received the same questionnaire that was designed to assess
information regarding how they learned of O.J. Simpson’s acquittal. The participants were asked
to provide information related to 4 main categories of information: informant, time, place, and
ongoing activity. The participants also rated their emotionality, and surprise, and how personally
and societally important they thought the event was via 7-point scales (1 meant low and 7 meant
high). Three types of rehearsal were examined by assessing the percentage of time the
participants reported having thought about, talked about, or listened to radio or television
programs concerning the event. Participants were not told that their memory would be tested a
second time.
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The Time 2 questionnaire included the same questions and instructions as the Time 1
questionnaire and two additional questions regarding the extent to which they had a visual image
of the event and how unique the event was. These questions were also asked via 7-point scales.
Scoring
We employed a three-point rating scale for judging the consistency of the four main
components. This approach is similar to coding systems used by other researchers (Conway et
al., 1994; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Respones were scored as either a 0, 1, or 2. A score of 2 was
given if participants reported the same information at Time 2 as they did at Time 1. A
consistency score of 1 was given if participants generally provided congruent information at
Time 2, but not exactly what was reported at Time 1, or if the Time 2 response was more general
or more specific than the Time 1 response. For example, a score of 1 was given if they originally
reported being on the third floor of Miller Hall on the Western Washington University campus
and then later reported being on campus. A score of 0 was given if the participant provided
inconsistent information at Time 1 and Time 2: if they originally reported being at school when
they heard the news, then they later reported being at home. Answers to the “When did it happen
question” could receive a half a point depending on how close they were in reporting the time
they had reported at Time 1. The four consistency scores were summed together to get a global
consistency score, which ranged from 0-8.
To score the amount of information recalled, we counted the number of words written
about the event and the number of propositions that the participants used. We quantified the
propositions by counting the number of subject-verb phrases and the number of affective
descriptions (e.g., surprised, angry). Subject-verb phrases indicated distinct propositions ( “I was
watching it on CNN”; “I was in class”; “My mom and I just looked at each other”). In some
instances, the verb was understood or implied by the question. For example, in the question
“Who first told you about the verdict”, writing “radio station” implies a verb.
Results
Consistency
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We found a difference in the consistency of responses as a function of when the
events were initially indexed, t (63) = 2.41, p = .019. The immediate group (M = 5.00,
SD = 2.03) provided less consistent reports of O.J. Simpson's acquittal than the delayed
group (M = 6.20, SD = 1.98). An omega-square revealed that 7.9% of the variability in
the consistency was explained by the timing of the initial documentation. Thus, as
predicted, we found that when memories are documented after a delay, they appear to be
more consistent than memories that are documented immediately after the event. If we
classify participants who had consistency scores above 7 as having flashbulb memories
and those with scores below 7 as not having flashbulb memories (see Conway et al., 1994
for a simialr classification criterion) then only 22.85% of the immediate group had
flashbulbs, whereas 53.34% of the delay group were classified as having flashbulb
memories.
Many participant ratings were reliably correlated with the consistency of reports
(see Table 2). Self reported measures of emotionality, surprise, personal significance, and
societal significance were not extremely high (see Table 3). In addition, we tested the
possibility that the observed differences in consistency as a function of group may have
been due to initial levels of the participants’ appraisals. However, a series of t-tests did
not reveal any difference in emotionality t (63) = 1.38, p = .171, surprise t (63) = .518, p
= .606, personal significance t (63) = 1.778, p = .08, or societal significance t (63) = .123,
p = .902 between the two groups. Therefore it is unlikely that the above appraisals are
driving the observed effect of consistency between the groups.
How Much was Written
The effect of delay on how much the participants wrote at Time 1 and Time 2 was analyzed
using 2X2 mixed model ANOVAs (delay group as a between-subjects factor and time as a withinsubjects factor). For the number of words, there was no effect of group, a main effect of time, F
(1,63) = 5.31, p = .024, MSE = 103.30, and no interaction. The participants wrote more words at
Time 1 than Time 2. There was a reliable correlation in the number of words reported at Time 1 and
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Time 2 for the immediate group r = .430 (p=.010) and the correlation for the delayed group
approached significance r = .341 (p = .065).
For the number of propositions there was a main effect of the delay group, F (1,63) = 9.88, p
= .003, MSE = 4.53, a main effect of time, F (1, 63) = 16.57, p < .001, MSE = 1.68, and a significant
interaction, F (1,63) = 5.37, p = .024, MSE = 1.68. The interaction shows that although both groups
included fewer propositions over time, the loss was greater for the immediate group. Put differently,
although the difference between the immediate group and the 1-week delay group was apparent at
both times, the difference is larger at Time 1 (see Table 4). There was a reliable correlation in the
number of propositions reported at Time 1 and Time 2 for the immediate group r = .424 (p=.011)
and the delayed group r = .517 (p = .003).

General Discussion
Does the timing of the initial indexing of an event influence the apparent consistency of
memories for that event? Yes. We found that participants who were initially tested immediately
after O.J. Simpson’s acquittal provided less consistent reports than participants who were
initially tested one week after the event. Our results confirm a trend observed in previous
flashbulb research: Researchers who initially indexed an event shortly after it occurred (Larsen,
1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Weaver, 1993) generally found lower levels of consistency than
researchers who waited longer before obtaining the initial documentation event (Christianson,
1989; Conway et al., 1994; Pillemer, 1984). Therefore, it appears that the time of initial testing
needs to be considered when conducting flashbulb memory studies.
There are several possible interpretations of these findings. First, this may be a simple
case of “Ebbinghausian” forgetting (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1913): a rapid initial period of forgetting
followed by asymptotic long-term retention. During the week immediately following O.J.'s
acquittal people may have forgotten some of the details associated with the event. If so, then the
delayed group’s initial reports would have been less detailed than the immediate group’s. If all
reports become less detailed over time, then the original documentation of the delayed group
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would have been more similar in level of detail to the final recollection. The immediate group
would thus have a more difficult task of providing consistent reports than would the delayed
group. Supporting this view, we found that more propositions were included in the immediate
group’s initial reports than the delayed group’s.
A second explanation of the time delay effect is that errors in memory were introduced in
the week immediately following the events. If this were the case, then the delayed group's errors
would be included in their initial index. In contrast, the immediate group errors would have been
incorporated into their memory after the initial indexing. Loftus and Kaufman (1992) noted that
it is possible to rehearse correct and incorrect details of an event. If consistent event details are
rehearsed there should be an increased likelihood of having a consistent report, but if
inconsistent event details are rehearsed then there should be an increased chance of having an
inconsistent report. Moreover, changes in memory may occur in response to the encoding of
additional information that requires updating old memories. Most people talked about and saw
media coverage pertaining to the O.J. acquittal during the week following those events. That
additional information may have altered the original memories to the deficit of the immediate
group's consistency scores.
As another way of explaining some memory errors, Brewer (1988, 1992) suggested that it
is possible that some individuals recall an experience that occurred but that the experience was
not the event originally described. Thus, the researchers score the Time 2 responses as incorrect
since they do not match the Time 1 responses. Brewer called this the wrong time slice
hypothesis (also see Neisser & Harsch, 1992). The reporting of wrong time slices is a possible
source of erroneous information in flashbulb type studies. For instance, if someone initially
reports that they were eating breakfast when learning of an important event, then later report that
they were talking with a roommate when they heard a news broadcast about the event, the latter
response would be scored as being incorrect. It is possible, however, that both events occurred,
but at different times. The person may have retrieved an event associated with hearing the news,
but not the originally documented event.
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These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, of course. Forgetting may
have been more rapid in the first few days following the event. At the same time, new details -both correct and incorrect -- may have been added to the original event memory precisely when
they would have been most influential.
Brown and Kulik (1977) suggested that a special mechanism was needed in order to
explain the remarkably long-lasting and detailed memories of important and consequential
events. Since then, many researchers have argued about whether it is necessary to postulate a
special mechanism (Conway, 1995; McCloskey et al., 1988; Neisser, 1982; 1988; Pillemer,
1990). Many of the arguments have been based on the purported accuracy (operationally defined
as consistency) of so called flashbulb memories (Neisser, 1986; Thompson & Cowan, 1986). Our
research indicates that interpretations of the consistency observed in various studies should
consider the time interval before an initial documentation. Learning about O.J. Simpson’s
acquittal did not yield exceptionally high levels of surprise, emotionality, and personal
significance, thus it may not have been a true flashbulb event. However, it is clear that
researchers should try to obtain the initial indexing of flashbulb type events as quickly as
possible. If this is not accomplished then results indicating memory consistency need to be
viewed skeptically. Future research should identify the processes that are involved in
undermining the consistency of reports that are immediately indexed. After an event, a memory
may be gradually consolidated as people forget some information, incorporate information from
other sources, and develop a narrative of the event.
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Table 1
Summary of Time Delays and Consistency Measures for Flashbulb Studies

Study

Event

Time To First
Recording

Neisser
et al. (1996)

News of Earthquake 2 & 9 days
at Emory

1.5 years

Combined Accuracy 55%
Percentage

Neisser
et al. (1996)

Earthquake
at Berkeley (mild)

1.5 years

Combined Accuracy 96%
Percentage

Neisser
et al. (1996)

Earthquake at
15-21 days
Santa Cruz (severe)

1.5 years

Combined Accuracy 99%
Percentage

Neisser
et al. (1996)

News of Bridge
at Berkeley

1-3 days

1.5 years

Combined
87%
Accuracy Percentage

Neisser
et al. (1996)

News of Bridge at
Santa Cruz

15-21 days

1.5 years

Combined
93%
Accuracy Percentage

Neisser and
Harsch (1992)

Challenger

1 day

2.5 years

Average Weighted
Accuracy Score

2.95 / 7
points (42%)

McCloskey
et al. (1988)

Challenger

about 3 days

9 months

% of inconsistent
responses

8.4%

Challenger

about 3 days

9 months

% of responses
not remembered

5.6%

Challenger

about 3 days

9 months

% of more general
responses

18.7%

Weaver (1993)

Gulf War

2 days

3 months

lenient scoring
method

72.5%
consistent

Weaver (1993)

Gulf War

2 days

1 year

lenient scoring
method

71.7%

Weaver (1993)

Gulf War

2 days

1 year

strict scoring
method

30.17%

Pillemer
(1984)

Reagan being
shot

1 month

5.5 months

consistency
ratings from 1 - 6

average rating
4.88 (81%)

Conway et al.
(1994)

Thatcher’s
Resignation for
U.K. Subjects

Within 14
days

11 months

Accuracy
Score (0-1)

Approximately
.9

Conway et al.
(1994)

Thatcher’s
Resignation for
non-U.K. Subjects

Within 14
days

11 months

Accuracy
Score (0-1)

Approximately
.6

1-3 days

Interval

Unit of
Measurement

Accuracy
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Note. Accuracy scores for Weaver's (1993) study were computed by averaging 5 canonical categories. Data from
Conway et al.’s study was estimated from Figure 1 (p. 331).

Flashbulb Memories 17

Table 2
Correlations and Probabilities of Significant Predictors of Consistency (n = 65)

Variable

Personal Importance

r

p

.35

.005

Time Thinking

.26

Surprise *

.25

.049

Personal Importance *

.36

.003

Societal Importance *

.28

.022

Time Thinking *

.25

.049

Visual Image *

.28

Confidence *

.38

.002

Uniqueness *

.31

.011

Note. * = Time 2 responses.

.036

.023
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Ratings of Surprise, Emotionality, Personal Importance and
Societal Importance

Emotionality Surprise

Personal

Societal

Importance

Importance

Time 1
Immediate Group

3.31 (1.75)

3.97 (1.77)

2.77 (1.59)

5.26 (1.52)

Delay Group

3.90 (1.65)

4.20 (1.77)

3.47 (1.55)

5.30 (1.24)

Immediate Group

3.34 (1.53)

3.89 (1.81)

2.49 (1.31)

4.83 (1.37)

Delay Group

3.73 (1.29)

4.33 (1.65)

3.13 (1.55)

5.13 (1.43)

Time 2
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for the Number of Propositions as a Function of Group and Time

Time
Delay Group

Time 1

Time 2

Immediate

7.97 (1.77)

6.51 (1.82)

Delay

6.27 (1.51)

5.87 (1.91)

Flashbulb Memories 20

Figure Caption
Figure 1. The Distribution of Consistency Scores by Group.
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